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Lawyers who serve corporate clients recognize that for sheer
shock value the ultimate resolution of the Securities and Exchange
Commission's (SEC) National Student Marketing Corp. litigation1
may never match the effect achieved by the Commission simply
through filing the complaint. The high drama achieved by the
SEC's action is, of course, attributable to its decision to allege viola-
tions of the securities laws2 on the part of not just the usual coterie of
accountants and insiders, but also by the law firms of W'hite &
Case and Lord, Bissell & Brook and by certain of their lawyers indi-
t A substantial portion of this article deals with securities laws violations
alleged by the Securities and Exchange Commission in SEC v. National Student
Marketing Corp., Civ. Action No. 225-72 (D.D.C., filed Feb. 3, 1972). The reader
should bear in mind that the SEC's factual allegations and legal theories have not as
yet stood the test of an adversary proceeding on the merits. Nothing said in this
article is meant to suggest that there is truth in the SECs charges of misconduct by
the defendants.
* Member, Ohio Bar. B.B.A., 1967; J.D., 1970, University of Notre
Dame.
This article was written in connection with course work for a graduate se-
curities law seminar which the author attended while a Fellow at the University
of Pennsylvania Law School Center for Study of Financial Institutions. The au-
thor is indebted to the Director of the Center, Professor Robert H. Mundheim,
for his invaluable counsel and assistance, and also thanks the practitioners and
students who participated in the seminar for their comments and suggestions.
The views expressed are his own.
1. SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., Civ. Action No. 225-72 (D.D.C.,
filed Feb. 3, 1972). For the text of the complaint, see [1971-1972 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 93,360, at 91,913 (D.D.C. 1972).
2. In the course of four claims for relief, the SEC asserts violations by vari-
ous defendants of section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)
(1970); section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, id.' § 78j(b)
(1970), and rule 10b-5 thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1972); and sec-
tions 13 and 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m and
78n(a), and "rules and regulations thereunder." The substantive allegations that
are material to this article are detailed at pp. 419-21 infra.
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vidually, together with a lawyer who is a sole practitioner.3
Almost as startling as the identity of the cast of defendants is
the measure of relief demanded-entry of injunctions permanently re-
straining the defendant attorneys from violating the securities laws.4
Besides making any future securities law violation by an enjoined de-
fendant a contempt of court, entry of the relief prayed for would
furnish the Commission with grounds for sanctioning the defendant
attorneys under rule 2(e) of the Commission's Rules of Practice.'
Among the penalties that could be imposed thereunder is suspension
of the privilege of appearing or practicing before the Commission.0
The drastic effect of such a sanction on a law firm's corporate prac-
tice is easily seen.
This article addresses one of the major issues raised by the SEC
in its charges against the defendant attorneys: the accountability of
3. The defendants: National Student Marketing Corp. (NSMC); Cortes
W. Randell, President, Chief Executive Officer and Director of NSMC; John G.
Davies, Vice President, General Counsel and a Director of NSMC; James F. Joy,
Executive Vice President and a Director of NSMC; Bernard J. Kurek, Controller
of NSMC; Roger 0. Walther, Director and former officer of NSMC; Peat, Mar-
wick, Mitchell & Co. (PMM); Anthony M. Natelli, partner in charge of PMM's
Washington, D.C., office; Joseph Scansaroli, former PMM accountant and As-
sistant Controller of NSMC; White & Case; Marion Jay Epley, III, partner of
White & Case; Robert A. Katz, attorney for purchasers of Compujob, Inc., from
NSMC; Cameron Brown, formerly President of Interstate National Corp. (INC),
now President and Chief Executive Officer of NSMC; Paul E. Allison, formerly
Director of INC and of INC's successor which is a wholly owned subsidiary of
NSMC; William J. Bach, same capacities as Allison; Robert P. Tate, formerly
INC's Chairman and a former Director of INC's successor; Lord, Bissell &
Brook; Max E. Meyer, Lord, Bissell partner and former INC board member;
Louis F. Schauer, Lord, Bissell partner.
Summary judgment was entered in favor of Allison, Bach and Tate in SEC v.
National Student Marketing Corp., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 93,820, at 93,552 (D.D.C. 1973). The basis for the granting of sum-
mary judgment with respect to these defendants was that entry of the permanent
injunction requested by the SEC would not further the public interest. Each of
the three had resigned all director or corporate insider positions held and would
not be expected to occupy such positions in the future. See id. at 93,563.
4. The injunctive relief requested has been termed "broad enough to cause
nightmares whenever a professional's opinion is sought," BNA SEC. REG. & L.
REP. No. 138, at A-3 (1972); and it has been noted that requests for injunctive
relief of the type sought by the Commission are usually "reserved for repeated
or notorious violators of the law." Karmel, Attorneys' Securities Law Liabilities,
27 Bus. LAw. 1153, 1155 (1972). For a general discussion of the framework
for equitable actions by the SEC, see Mathews, SEC Civil Injunction Actions I
& 11, 5 REv. SEc. REG. 949, 969 (1972).
5. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1972). For a general discussion of rule 2(e), see
Comment, SEC Disciplinary Rules and the Federal Securities Laws: The Regula-
tion, Role and Responsibilities of the Attorney, 1972 DuKE L.J. 969.
6. 17 C.F.R. § 202.2(e)(3) (1972).
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a lawyer for his opinion letters. The SEC's allegations and theories
of recovery based upon opinions rendered by the defendant attorneys
are considered in conjunction with a more general analysis of coun-
sel's exposure for his opinion letters at common law and under the se-
curities laws. Following that discussion, attention is given to an an-
notated set of guidelines drafted to assist lawyers in fulfilling their
legal and professional responsibilities in the rendition of opinion let-
ters. To lend some perspective to those analyses, the initial segment
of the article briefly examines the modem phenomenon of the ex-
panding constitutencies of the business manager and the lawyer who
advises him.
THE LAWYER AND His CORPORATE CLIENT
Just as it is readily apparent that the close working relationship
between the bar and its business clientele has been a vastly useful
and profitable one for both sides, it is clear that there are also dan-
gers inherent in this symbiotic existence. Some of these dangers
were pointed out by a group of able jurists during the 1920's and
1930's. Operating as a sort of "Distant Early Warning System,"
commentators such as Chief Justice William Howard Taft,7 Adolph
A. Berle8 and Chief Justice Harlan Stone? openly wondered whether,
in striving to meet the demands of its corporate clients, a large seg-
ment of the bar was not sacrificing some of its own character and
integrity-its soul-not to mention its independence of thought and
action. Chief Justice Stone phrased his views especially forcefully:
Steadily the best skill and capacity of the profession has been drawn
into the exacting and highly specialized service of business and fi-
nance. At its best the changed system has brought to the command
of the business world loyalty and a superb proficiency and technical
skill. At its worst it has made the learned profession of an earlier
day the obsequious servant of business, and tainted it with the morals
and manners of the market place in its most anti-social manifestations.
In any case we must concede that it has given us a Bar. . .whose
energy and .talent for public service and for bringing the law into har-
mony with changed conditions have been largely absorbed in the ad-
vancement of the interests of clients.' 0
The answer to Stone's broadside was delivered by Robert
7. See Taft, Legal Ethics, I BOSTON U.L. REV. 233 (1921).
8. See Berle, The Modern Legal Profession, in IX ENCYLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 340 (1933).
9. See Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1934).
10. Id. at 7.
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Swaine. Writing in 1949,11 Swaine branded Stone's charge that the
profession had become the "obsequious servant of business" as "in-
temperate and exaggerated,"'1 2 pointing out that the profession "has
conducted itself with standards of morals and manners fully abreast
of the morals and manners of the times; indeed usually ahead of
them."" Swaine nevertheless acknowledged that the closeness of
the relationship between the legal profession and its business clients
had bred some dubious practices. In particular, Swaine questioned
the propriety of allowing an attorney in substance to become his own
client through acting as a client's director or officer, 4 and he ob-
served that
it must be conceded that professional service to a single corporate
client long continued contains a real threat to the lawyer's indepen-
dence of thought, or at least of expression. . . . Loyalty to the cli-
ent is a fundamental tenet of our profession. Where the limits of
such loyalty are to be drawn is often a difficult question.15
Few would quarrel with Swaine's observations that client loyalty
is a "fundamental tenet of our profession." For the lawyer who
serves business interests, it may be difficult to identify just who the
"client" is, however. Is the client: (1) management; (2) the board
of directors; (3) the shareholders; (4) all of the above; or (5)
none of the above?' This question is not so easily answered by a
11. Swaine, The Impact of Business on the Profession: An Answer to Critics of
the Modern Bar, 35 A.B.A.J. 89 (1949).
12. Id. at 171.
13. Id.
14. id. at 170. Swaine's discomfort concerning the practice was highlighted
by his claim that most corporate lawyers would be "greatly relieved" if lawyers
were barred from serving as directors of their clients by a canon of ethics, Id.
As was pointed out in an article written in 1956 by Martin Mayer, Swaine's "in-
tensely effective answer" to Chief Justice Stone's criticism was remembered well
by the profession, but his call for a canon outlawing acceptance of board positions
with client firms by lawyers was soon forgotten. Mayer, Keepers of the Business
Conscience, HARPER'S MAGAZINE, Feb., 1956, at 50, 56. The efficacy of the prac-
tice criticized by Mr. Swaine is increasingly being called into question these days.
See EXPANDING REsPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE SECURIEs ACTS TRANSCRIPT 166-68 (S.
Goldberg ed. 1973); PLI, How To Go PUBLIC 310 (1971) (remarks of Prof. Donald
E. Schwartz); Hoffman, Gradations in Liability, 27 Bus. LAw. 173, 176-77 (Special
Issue Feb., 1972); Lefkowitz, The Attorney-Client Relationship and the Corporation,
14 Co"p. PRAc. COMMENTATOR 21 (1972); Loss, The Opinion, 24 Bus. LAw. 527, 529
(1969). Cf. Marco v. Dulles, 169 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), where it was noted
that
acts [of a lawyer] as a director cannot be separated from his acts as a
member of the firm who were [sic] general counsel for the corporation. The
line between the two is entirely too fine to permit the professional obli-
gation as a lawyer and the fiduciary obligation as a director to be placed
in convenient separate boxes. Id. at 631.
15. Swaine, supra note 11, at 171.
16. According to the Code of Professional Responsibility, the answer is plain
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lawyer who works on a day-to-day basis with the corporation's ex-
ecutives, sits on the corporation's board, and regularly prepares and
files documents with the SEC for submission to shareholders.
Apart from the always troublesome "who is your client" ques-
tion, the modem business lawyer, not unlike the corporate manager
he advises, finds his professional environment increasingly compli-
cated by a changing corporate scene. There was not always such
confusion. In the bygone days of the moguls it was clear enough
for the businessman that being a part of the management team
meant serving the interests of the stockholders, and the raison d'6tre
of the corporation's legal counsel was service to management. Those
dark ages never knew appellations such as Ralph Nader; class ac-
tion; ecology; Title VII; rule 10b-5; Pomerantz, Levy, Haudek &
Block; products liability or BarChris Construction Corporation. In
those times judges did not say things like "a defective security should
be no different from a defective product. Both carry dangerous
consequences for the unsuspecting consumer."'1  Why, it seems like
only yesterday that a "defective product" was called a "lemon" and
a "consumer" was just someone who used things up.
What has happened is that the times have changed.. Responsi-
bilities that were never recognized previously have now come into
view. The obligations of corporate management no longer can be
viewed as running solely to the entity's ownership interest; instead,
enough: (5) none of the above. Ethical Consideration 5-18 tells us that:
A lawyer employed or retained by a corporation or similar entity
owes his allegiance to the entity and not to a stockholder, director, offi-
cer, employee, representative, or other person connected with the en-
tity. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSMIIY AND CANONS OF
JUDICIAL ETMICS, ETHICAL CONSIDERATION 5-18, at 20 (1971).
This guidance is rather meaningless in a specific context, a point demon-
strated by the conflict arising when a corporation seeks to assert the attorney-
client privilege against its own shareholders. See Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 280 F.
Supp. 1018 (N.D. Ala. 1968) (holding corporation could not assert privilege
against stockholders in suit charging mismanagement), vacated, 430 F.2d 1093
(5th Cir. 1970) (ordering evidentiary hearing as to availability of privilege on
facts presented), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971), on remand, [1972-73 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. % 93,600 (N.D. Ala. 1972) (rejecting asser-
tion of privilege after hearing). The initial Garner holding was followed in
Fischer v. Wolfinbarger, 45 F.R.D. 510 (W.D. Ky. 1968) (where the court noted
that "[a] corporate entity acts only for its stockholders . . . ." Id. at 511).
See also Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Fielding, 343 F. Supp. 537, 547-48 (D.
Nev. 1972) (indicating that "the corporation is the client"); Kaplan, Conflicts of
Interest in Corporate Law Practice, in THIRD ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES
REGULATION 231, 234-37 (1972).
17. Black & Co. v. Nova-Tech, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 468, 472 (D. Ore. 1971)
(The phrases quoted were prefaced by the important words: "For jurisdictional
purposes . . .").
Vol. 1973:3711
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
management finds itself answerable to a host of different groups, in-
cluding its employees, its customers and the public at large. Cou-
pled with this expansion of management's constituencies is one of
the leading developments of the 1960's-the threat to management of
personal and professional humiliation by reason of individual lia-
bility for misdeeds in the conduct of business matters.1 8  These phe-
nomena of an increasingly complex business world have served to
make corporate managers ever more dependent on purveyors of le-
gal advice. Attorneys' views carry more clout than they used to be-
cause clients need attorneys more. And as attorneys come to be
idealized as the "due diligence men' 19 and the "corporate con-
science,"20 they must expect that the changing times will require of
them a stricter accountability for their actions.2
Just as is the case with corporate management, these ideas of
increased accountability and broadening responsibilities mean that
the legal profession must now begin to cope with hitherto unrecog-
18. The impact on corporations of what has been called "the legal explosion"
is discussed in Caruth, The "Legal Explosion" Has Left Business Shell-shocked,
FORTUNE, April, 1973, at 65. The significance of business management's ex-
panding constituencies and increasing vulnerability to charges of misconduct has
received the attention of the bar. E.g., Proceedings, ABA Nat'l Institute, Cor-
porations Under Attack, in 28 Bus. LAw. 1 (Special Issue 1973); Proceedings,
ABA Nat'l Institute, Officers' and Directors' Responsibilities and Liabilities, in
27 Bus. LAw. 1 (Special Issue Feb., 1972).
19. You represent the company. Who represents the outside directors?
There used to be some talk at these panels that the outside directors
should get together and hire a lawyer or financial adviser or somebody
called the "due diligence man." The "due diligence man" would sit with
the company lawyers, exercising due diligence 12 hours a day, looking
over their shoulders, reporting back to his clients. That has not caught
on, because I think everybody feels the "due diligence man" is already
there. He is the company's lawyer. PLI, PROTECrINo THE CoRPoRlATE
OFxican ANY DRETOR FROM LADmrrY 70 (1970) (remarks of Alan
Applebaum).
20. Panel Discussion, The Corporate Conscience and the Corporate Bar, 26
Bus. LAw. 959 (1971) (focusing on the corporate lawyer's conscience). A dif-
ferent use of the phrase appears in the context of boards of directors. Professor
Myles Mace points this out in his sprightly analysis of what directors can do-
and what they end up doing. M. MACE, DiRaCTORS: MYTH AND REALITY 26-27
(1971). See also Mayer, supra note 14, at 50.
21. In the well-turned phrasing of a recent California Supreme Court opinion,
it was stated:
[Iln our complex and interdependent society, human relations are ever
being further fit into a framework of legal rights and responsibilities,
and, in this process, the role of the lawyer has become increasingly cru-
cial. As more individuals come to depend upon him, his responsibility
must broaden and deepen. Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart &
Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 194, 491 P.2d 421, 432-33, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837,
848-49 (1971).
In Neel the court brought the California rule covering the running of the statute
of limitations for lawyers' malpractice in line with the rule applied in cases of
malpractice by other professionals.
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nized duties owed to new constituencies. As the following discus-
sion demonstrates, just as the businessman can no longer escape lia-
bility for his defective goods once they are resold by his immediate
vendee, lawyers are similarly encountering an increasing willingness
on the part of courts to impose liability for slipshod legal work in
favor of those persons who could have foreseeably been expected to
be affected directly by or led to rely on the lawyer's toil. In other
words, the requirement of privity in malpractice cases belongs on a
list of endangered species.
The saga of the corporate lawyer's emerging responsibilities is
far from being simply the story of a developing framework of sub-
stantive liability, however. There is inherent in the idea of the law-
yer's being favored with a monopoly license to practice law the
premise that his performance as a professional will be subjected to
self-regulation by the lawyer himself and to more formal regulation
by the profession as a whole. As we start this survey of the con-
tours of the lawyer's role in preparing legal opinions, it should be
kept in mind that there is a good deal more to our study than map-
ping out the limits of a lawyer's substantive exposure to legal
sanctions. For one thing, the law of professional malpractice is in
flux, and this situation makes the use of yesterday's guidelines to
chart today's actions dangerous business. Further, the concept of
litigation as a distasteful way to settle disputes is fundamental to our
legal system.22 How much more unpalatable is the use of litigation
to obtain guidelines for professional development?
DEVELOPMENTS IN MALPRACTICE LAW
The Standard of Care
Legal malpractice consists of the failure of an attorney "to use
such skill, prudence, and diligence as lawyers of ordinary skill and
capacity commonly possess and exercise in the performance of the
tasks which they undertake. ' 23  When such failure proximately
22. Indeed, the American Bar Association's pamphlet setting forth the Code
of Professional Responsibility pointedly includes the following quotation from
Abraham Lincoln:
Discourage litigation. Persuade your neighbors to compromise when-
ever you can. Point out to them how the nominal winner is often the
real loser-in fees, expenses and waste of time. As a peacemaker, the
lawyer has a superior opportunity of being a good man. CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPoNsmmrry, supra note 16, at 48.
23. Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 591, 364 P.2d 685, 689, 15 Cal. Rptr.
821, 825 (1961). See generally Leavitt, The Attorney as Defendant, 13 HASTINGS
L.. 1, 23-32 (1961); Wade, The Attorney's Liability for Negligence, 12 VAND.




causes damages, it gives rise to a cause of action in tort.24 More-
over, since in the usual case the attorney has undertaken to perform
his duties pursuant to a contract with his client, his failure to exercise
the requisite skill and care is also a breach of an express or implied
term of that contract.25 Thus, an instance of legal malpractice will
generally, give rise to both a cause of action in tort and a breach of
contract claim.2 6
Obviously, not every miscue by an attorney will give rise to mal-
practice liability. As the California Supreme Court pointed out in
Lucas v. HamM, 27
[t]he attorney is not liable for every mistake he may make in his
practice; he is not, in the absence of an express agreement, an in-
surer of the soundness of his opinions or of the validity of an instru-
ment he is engaged to draft; and he is not liable for being in error as
to a question of law on which reasonable doubt may be entertained
by well-informed lawyers . . . . These principles are equally appli-
cable whether the plaintiff's claim is based on tort or breach of con-
tract.28
The court's sincerity in its proclamation that an attorney is not "an
insurer of his opinions or of the validity of an instrument he is en-
gaged to draft" is established by its refusal to allow recovery from
the defendant attorney for misinterpreting the Rule Against Perpetu-
ities, notwithstanding that the particular blunder committed could
have been avoided had the defendant consulted decisional authority
interpreting the Rule that was on the books at the time the defective
instrument was drafted.2 9 Noting that the Rule had been referred
to as "a dangerous instrumentality in the hands of most members of
the bar," 0 the court felt that the level of skill exercised by the de-
fendant was in line with that generally used by lawyers.
To be distinguished from instances involving negligent malprac-
tice by attorneys are those cases where the attorney's wrongful con-
24. Cf. Averill, Attorney's Liability to Third Parties for Negligent Malprac-
tice, 2 LAIND & WATER L. REv. 379 (1967).
25. E.g., Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 198 (1880); Wilcox v. Executors
of Plummer, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 172 (1830).
26. E.g., Lucas v. Harem, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 589 n.2, 364 P.2d 685, 688 n.2,
15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 824 n.2 (1961); Wade, supra note 23; Note, supra note 23, at
1292-94.
27. 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961).
28. Id. at 591-92, 364 P.2d at 689, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 825 (citations omitted).
29. See Note, supra note 23, at 1297.
30. Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 592, 364 P.2d 685, 690, 15 Cal. Rptr.
821, 826 (1961), quoting Leach, Perpetuities Legislation, Massachusetts Style, 67
HAxv. L. REv. 1349 (1954).
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duct involves fraud. A professional may be held liable for fraud
based on either an intentional misrepresentation or a representation
made where there was no basis for a belief in its accuracy. New
York's highest court has stated the rule as follows:
A representation certified as true to the knowledge of the ac-
countants when knowledge there is none, a reckless misstatement,
or an opinion based on grounds so flimsy as to lead to the conclu-
sion there was no genuine belief in its truth, are all sufficient upon
which to base liability [for fraud]. A refusal to see the obvious, a
failure to investigate the doubtful, if sufficiently gross, may furnish
evidence leading to an inference of fraud so as to impose liability
for losses suffered by those who rely on the balance sheet. In
other words, heedlessness and reckless disregard of consequences
may take the place of deliberate intention.3'
The Limits of Liability
The significance of the distinction between negligent malpractice
and professional misconduct amounting to fraud is found in the de-
gree of exposure to liability resulting from the wrongdoing. In the
case of fraudulent misrepresentation, a misrepresenter may be held
liable to all persons whom he should reasonably have foreseen would
be injured by his misrepresentation.32 On the other hand, the lim-
its of an attorney's exposure for negligent malpractice are not so
easy to define. Venerable authority demonstrating two conflicting
views is the Supreme Court's 1880 decision in Savings Bank v.
Ward.3 "  In that case, the defendant attorney had conducted a
title search and had given his client a certificate stating the legal
opinion that the land was held by the client in fee simple. Relying
on the certificate, the plaintiff bank made a loan to the client secured
31. State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104, 112, 15 N.E.2d 416, 419
(1938). See also Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85, 90 (D.R.I. 1968)
("[tihe same broad perimeter [applicable to intentional misrepresentation] pre-
vails if the misrepresenter's conduct is heedless enough to permit an inference of
fraud"); Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 189, 174 N.E. 441, 448 (1931)
(speaking of the liability of accountants for their audit, Judge Cardozo observed that
"if their audit has been so negligent as to justify a finding that they had no genuine
belief in its adequacy. . . this . . . is fraud").
32. E.g., Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 205 (1880); Rusch Factors, Inc.
v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85, 90 (D.R.I. 1968). The court in Rusch Factors gave
several reasons in support of a broad right of recovery in cases of fraudulent misrep-
resentation:
First, liability should extend at least as far in fraud, an intentional tort,
as it does in negligence cases resulting in personal injury or property
damage. Second, the risk of loss for intentional wrongdoing should in-
variably be placed on the wrongdoer who caused the harm, rather than on
the innocent victim of the harm. Finally, a broad rule of liability may
deter future misconduct. Id. (citation omitted).
33. 100 U.S. 195 (1880).
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by the realty. When the client defaulted and the deed proved worth-
less, the bank sued for malpractice.
Reasoning from cases such as Winterbottom v. Wright,4 a six-
justice majority ruled that lack of privity with the defendant attorney
barred the plaintiff from recovery. The contrary view was suc-
cinctly stated by Chief Justice Waite on behalf of the minority:
I think if a lawyer, employed to examine and certify to the recorded
title of real property, gives his client a certificate which he knows or
ought to know is to be used by the client in some business transaction
with another person as evidence of the facts certified to, he is liable to
such other person relying on his certificate for any loss resulting from
his failure to find on record a conveyance affecting the title, which,
by the use of ordinary professional care and skill, he might have
found. That, it seems to me, is this case.35
Thus, the Ward case represents a confrontation between the view
that privity is a sine qua non for negligent malpractice recovery and
the position that, where reliance is or should be foreseen, recovery
may be had by one member of a foreseeable class who relies on a
lawyer's judgment.3 0 Although Ward is obviously of importance to
an understanding of the bounds of a lawyer's responsibility for his
legal opinions, it is by no means the only pertinent authority, be-
cause, as we shall see, the boundaries of lawyers' opinion letter ex-
posure are to a great extent shaped by developments in professional
malpractice law generally.
Two important decisions by the New York Court of Appeals,
Glanzer v. Shepherd 7 and Ultramares Corp. v. Touche"8 add fur-
ther definition to the general scope of a professional's liability for
negligence. Glanzer involved a suit by a third party against a
public weigher who had negligently overweighed a load of beans,
causing the plaintiff to pay for more beans that were received.
The defendant's client had requested that the defendant furnish the
plaintiff with a return of the weight, so reliance by the plaintiff on
the defendant's work was clearly foreseeable. On these facts, Judge
Cardozo had no difficulty allowing recovery by the plaintiff. Lack
34. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
35. Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 207 (1880).
36. While the identity of the plaintiff in Ward was not foreseen by defendant
attorney, reliance on the certificate of title was clearly a foreseeable act since
such certificates are commonly used as a basis for making loans. See Annot.,
Attorney's Liability, to One Other than His Immediate Client, For Consequences
of Negligence in Carrying Out Legal Duties, 45 A.L.R.3d 1181, 1200 (1972).
37. 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
38. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
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of privity was no barrier, the court held, since "[gliven the contract
and the relation the duty is imposed by law."39
In contrast with Glanzer, Ultramares involved an action brought
against an accounting firm by a creditor whose reliance on financial
statements was found to be unforeseen in fact, though reliance by
some creditor was or should have been foreseen since the account-
ants knew that their client's operation required large amounts of
credit and that the certified financial statements would be circulated
to creditors. The defendant in Ultramares was alleged to have certi-
fied wrongfully that a balance sheet accurately reflected a one mil-
lion dollar net worth when the audited company was insolvent. The
plaintiff alleged that in reliance on the bogus balance sheet he had
loaned money to the insolvent company. Since the defendant's negli-
gence was clear, the only question for the court was whether the de-
defendant had breached a duty owed to the plaintiff. Again writing
for the majority, Judge Cardozo this time refused to find the requisite
duty. Glanzer was held to be inapposite because there the service
rendered was primarily for the information of the identified third
party and only incidentally for the formal promisee. The defendant
in Ultramdres, on the other hand, was said to have certified the fi-
nancials primarily for the benefit of its client and only incidentally
or collaterally for the use of those individuals to whom the statements
might be exhibited.40
The motivating force behind the court's decision to deny liability
appears to spring from the same sentiment that underlies modem
holdings which refuse to sanction use of the class action where to do
so would result in massive liability. Just as such recent cases have
decried the possibility of "horrendous, possibly annihilating punish-
ment,"4 Ultramares discloses an expression of the fear that to in-
39. 233 N.Y. at 239, 135 N.E. at 276 (citation omitted).
40. 255 N.Y. at 182-83, 174 N.E. at 445-46.
41. E.g., Kriger v. European Health Spa, Inc., 56 F.R.D. 104 (E.D. Wis.
1972); Rogers v. Cobur Fin. Corp., 54 F.R.D. 417 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Ratner v.
Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). These cases
were brought under the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-81 (1970).
Section 130(a), id. § 1640(a), provides for a minimum recovery of $100 by any
person aggrieved by a violation of the exceedingly technical act. For another
example of a court bending under the influence of public policy considerations
and refusing to expand the parameters of liability to the fullest extent imaginable,
see Hall v. Coburn Corp., 26 N.Y.2d 396, 311 N.Y.S.2d 281, 259 N.E.2d 720
(1970). The defendant in Hall had used less than 8 point type in its sales con-
tracts in violation of section 402 of the New York Retail Installment Sales Act,
N.Y. Pots. Paop. L.w c. 41, § 402 (McKinney 1962). In cases of violation, the
Installment Sales Act provided for recovery of the finance charges imposed, and
plaintiff sought recovery for herself and a class of all persons having contracts
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pose liability in favor of the plaintiff creditor would lead to a rule
exposing professionals to liability for negligence "in an indetermi-
nate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class." '42
This essential policy commitment to protection of professionals from
widespread liability for careless error did not, in the court's mind at
least, conflict with the policy of giving recognition to the reasonable
expectations of a party not in privity, since the court doubted whether
"the average businessman receiving a certificate without paying for
it, and receiving it merely as one of a multitude of possible investors,"
would expect to recover from the certifying accountant for an "honest
blunder."4
At a time when Dean Prosser's citadel of privity has been pretty
much reduced to rubble and when courts are increasingly unwilling
to bar recovery in products liability cases on the ground that the
damage done was economic harm rather than personal injury, 4 there
is strong reason to doubt whether courts will be content either to
using similar type size. The court refused to allow recovery on behalf of the class,
saying that "Etihe public value" of class action relief was "open to substantial
doubt" since the suit did not address "the real evil of retail credit buying," which
was identified as "the heavy cost of credit to consumers." Hall v. Coburn Corp.,
26 N.Y.2d at 403, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 285, 259 N.E.2d at 723. Though the Hall
case has been criticized as "outrageous procedural law," the result achieved is
hardly shocking in light of such decisions as Ratner, Rogers and Kriger. See
Dole, Private Enforcement of Consumer Credit Legislation, 26 Bus. LAw. 915,
923 (1971).
In a similar vein one may wonder whether it can be said that recovery by a
person injured by management malfeasance, in a suit against accountants who fail
to uncover the malfeasance, really addresses itself to the aim of preventing or
minimizing instances of mismanagement. It would seem germane for a court
called upon to rule in an Ultramares-type setting to consider whether an extra
measure of diligence could be wrung out of the defendant professional by a lia-
bility decree, and if so, whether this benefit might not be outweighed by inhibi-
tions on the profession's ability to function in a climate where the threat of
devastating punishment for honest blunders would attend everyday actions.
42. 255 N.Y. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444. One major difference between the
class action cases such as Ratner, Rogers, Kriger and Hall and the factual setting
of Ultramares deserves mention. In the class actions, the damages that would
have been imposed pursuant to applicable statutory provisions (such as the $100
minimum under the Truth in Lending Act), would not necessarily have borne any
relation to actual economic harm. This would not be the case in a malpractice
suit.
43. Id. at 189, 174 N.E. at 448.
44. The leading case allowing recovery for economic harm under a strict lia-
bility theory is Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305
(1965). For a discussion of the issues involved and additional cases on point, see
Annot., Privity of Contract as Essential in Actions Against Remote Manufacturer
or Distributor for Defects in Goods Not Causing Injury to Person or to Other
Property, 16 A.L.R.3d 683 (1967).
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follow Ultramares on its facts or to honor Judge Cardozo's dicta
that the right to recovery for negligent malpractice "is one that is
bounded by the contract."4 5  Presaging a break with the traditional
pro-privity view is the tentative draft of section 552 of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts.4" Under the terms of the section, liability for
negligent malpractice may be imposed on a defendant in favor of a
reliant party not in privity whether or not the defendant knew of the
injured party's identity at the time of the negligent act;47 it is sufficient
that the plaintiff be a person or a member of a class of persons for
whose benefit or guidance the defendant intended to supply informa-
45. 255 N.Y. at 189, 174 N.E. at 448. Despite this language it is, of course,
still possible to use Glanzer to support a judgment of liability in the face of a
lack of privity where the plaintiff's reliance was actually foreseen at the time the
malpractice was committed. E.g., Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85
(D.R.I. 1968); Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969). Nevertheless, some
courts have chosen to read Ultramares as limiting recovery for negligent malprac-
tice to those bound by the contract. E.g., Stephens Indus. Inc. v. Haskins & Sells,
438 F.2d 357, 359 (10th Cir. 1971); State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104,
15 N.E.2d 416 (1938); Duro Sportswear, Inc. v. Cogen, 131 N.Y.S.2d 20 (Sup.
Ct. 1954). In both State Street Trust Co. and Duro the identity of the reliant
party was known beforehand by defendant accountant. The Duro case is criti-
cized in Bradley, Liability to Third Persons for Negligent Audit, 1966 J. Bus.
LAW 190, 193.
46. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 522 (Tent. Draft No. 12 1966). The
section reads as follows:
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession, or employment
b I . supplies false information for the guidance of others in their
business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused
to them by their justifiable reliance upon such information, if he
fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or
communicating the information.
(2) Except as stated in subsection (3), the liability stated in subsec-
tion (1) is limited to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of the persons for whose benefit and
guidance he intends to supply the information, or knows
that the recipient intends to supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction which he intends the
information to influence, or knows that the recipient so in-
tends, or in a substantially similar transaction.
(3) The liability of one who is under a public duty to give the informa-
tion extends to loss suffered by any of the class of persons for
whose benefit the duty is created, in any of the transactions in
which it is intended to protect them.
47. In other words, it is not required that the person who is to become the
plaintiff be identified or known to the defendant as an individual when
the information is supplied. It is enough that the maker of the repre-
sentation intends it to reach and influence either a particular person or
persons, known to him, or a group or class of persons, distinct from the
much larger class who might reasonably be expected sooner or later to
have access to the information, and foreseeably to take some action in
reliance upon it. It is enough, likewise, that the maker of the represen-
tation knows that the recipient intends to transmit the information to a
similar person, persons, or group. It is sufficient, in other words, that
the maker knows that the information is intended for repetition to a cer-
tain group or class of persons, and that the plaintiff proves to be one
of them, even though the maker never had heard of him when the in-
formation was given. Id., comment h, at 23.
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tion, or to whom the defendant knew the information would be sup-
plied.48
In repudiating Ultramares, the Restatement essentially elevates
to majority status the dissent of Chief Justice Waite in Ward nearly
a century ago.49  The only difference between the two views is that
the Restatement frames the scope of the duty owed in terms of the
actual perception of potentially reliant parties by the actor. On the
other hand, the Ward dissent's formulation goes further and reaches
"should have known" cases. The dissent would allow establishment
of the requisite duty owed by reason of inferred knowledge of in-
tended reliance based on custom and usage-such as reliance on
opinions as to the state of title by lenders. Whether this distinction
has any real significance is open to serious question, since in either
case the expectation of the reliant third party in a quality work prod-
uct would be the same, and it is mainly in terms of giving effect to the
reasonable expectations of the reliant third party that any sense can
be made of extending the professional's malpractice exposure be-
yond the bounds of privity.50
Section 552's potential for being read to signal the demise of
Ultramares has not been ignored by the courts. In Rusch Factors,
48. A hypothetical situation based on one of a series used by the section's
draftsmen illustrates their intention to part with Ultramares and its progeny. A is
negotiating with a Bank for a credit of $50,000. The Bank requires an audit by
certified public accountants. A employs B & Company, a firm of accountants, to
make the audit, telling them he is going to negotiate a bank loan. A does not get
his loan from the first bank but does negotiate a loan with another bank, which relies
upon B & Company's certified statements. The audit carelessly overstates the financial
resources of A, and in consequence the second bank suffers pecuniary loss. B &
Company is subject to liability to the second bank. Id,, illustration 4, at 24.
49. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
50. This analysis is not meant to give the Restatement a broader reading
than it deserves, however. Another illustration used by the draftsmen demon-
strates their intention that the scope of malpractice exposure of accountants should
not extend to every instance where a plaintiff could allege reliance on certified finan-
cials. RFSTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS, supra note 46, § 552, illustration 7,
at 25. The only point made here is that in the case of an opinion given for a
well-recognized purpose that customarily involves reliance by third parties, such as
a certificate of title, there does not seem to be anything extreme in upholding a
right to recovery on behalf of an injured reliant party. As the discussion below
of different types of legal opinions indicates, there is much room for this middle
ground between the Restatement's individual, who is a reliant member of an ac-
tually foreseen class, and Judge Cardozo's member of the "indeterminate class" of
all persons who might foreseeably rely on an opinion.
It should be noted that there are other justifications for allowing recovery
from professionals in addition to the interest in insuring that a reliant third party
recoups his losses. See note 52 infra and text accompanying note 58 infra.
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Inc. v. Levin5' the provision was cited favorably by the district court
en route to its holding that a finance company had stated a good
cause of action against an accountant who was alleged to have negli-
gently certified financial statements relied on by the plaintiff. While
the facts in question revealed that reliance by the plaintiff had been
clearly foreseen by the defendant accountant, making the situation
more analogous to Glanzer than Ultramares, the court nevertheless
took the occasion to denounce Ultramares in no uncertain terms.52
The court further ruled that the plaintiff had stated a good cause of
action in fraud, noting that privity was no barrier in such cases and
that proof of gross negligence could suffice for recovery.5 3
The reasoning of the court in Rusch Factors with respect to the
demise of privity as a prerequisite for recovery found favor with
Iowa's Supreme Court in Ryan v. Kanne.54  Like the court in Rusch
Factors, the Iowa court castigated Ultramares as "an unwarranted
inroad upon the principle that the risk reasonably to be perceived
defines the duty to be obeyed."35  Needless to say, the court in
Ryan, like the court in Rusch Factors, had no difficulty permitting
recovery in favor of a party who was actually foreseen by the defend-
ant accountant at the time the financial statements in question were
prepared.
Adding to the significance of the sentiments expressed in sec-
tion 552, Rusch Factors, and Ryan is the apparent willingness of
California's Supreme Court to depart from precedent extending all
the way back to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Ward. Thus in Biakanja v. Irving,56 the court rejected prior prece-
dent57 and allowed a beneficiary of an invalid will to recover from
the individual who negligently failed to have it attested properly. The
following analysis was offered to assist courts called on in the future
51. 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968).
52. The wisdom of the decision in Ultramares had been doubted . . .and
this Court shares the doubt. Why should an innocent reliant party be
forced to carry the weighty burden of an accountant's professional mal-
practice? Isn't the risk of loss more easily distributed and fairly spread
by imposing it on the accounting profession, which can pass the cost of
insuring against the risk onto its customers, who can in turn pass the cost
onto the entire consuming public? Finally, wouldn't a rule of foreseeabil-
ity elevate the cautionary techniques of the accounting profession? For
these reasons it appears to this Court that the decision in Ultramares
constitutes an unwarranted inroad upon the principle that "[t]he risk
reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed." Id. at 90-91.
53. Id. at 90.
54. 170 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969).
55. Id. at 401.
56. 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
57. Buckley v. Gray, 110 Cal. 339, 42 P. 900 (1895).
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to determine the rights of third parties allegedly injured by negligent
malpractice:
The determination whether in a specific case the defendant will
be held liable to a third person not in privity is a matter of policy and
involves the balancing of various factors, among which are the extent
to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, the fore-
seeability of harm to him, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff
suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defen-
dant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to
the defendant's conduct, and the policy of preventing future harm. 8
The California court's rejection of a set test to measure exposure
in malpractice cases leaves needed room for recognition of the widely
varying circumstances in which professionals act and render their
opinions. While this flexibility is of limited significance in the case
of audit certificates in view of their essentially homogeneous nature,
legal opinions are issued in widely varying contexts requiring individ-
ual analysis of the type called for in Biakana.9
In concluding this brief outline of professional malpractice, one
might well note again that the times have changed. Courts are a
good deal more venturesome in this area than they once were. The
core of the Supreme Court's pro-privity reasoning in Ward was ex-
pressed in its claim that "[t]he only safe rule is to confine the right to
recover to those who enter into the contract; if we go one step be-
ypnd that, there is no reason why we should not go fifty."0  In
sharp contrast with this stance is the considerably more aggressive
attitude adopted by the California Supreme Court in a recent deci-
sion that brings the statute of limitations period for malpractice by
lawyers in line with that for malpractice by other professionals. In
that case the court emphasized that "[t]he legal calling can ill afford
the preservation of a privileged protection against responsibility. '
While the requirement of privity in malpractice cases is still adhered
to in many states, California is not one of them, and given the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court's impressive credentials as a trend-setter, 2
58. Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 650, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (1958).
59. For discussion of some differing contexts in which legal opinions are
issued, see pp. 387-96 infra.
60. 100 U.S. at 203 (1880).
61. Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 194, 491
P.2d 421, 433, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837, 849 (1971).
62. Consider, for example, the very warm reception given the California
Supreme Court's landmark collateral estoppel decision of Bernhard v. Bank of
Am. Natl Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942). See, e.g.,
Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 323-24,
326-27, 349 (1971); Goolsby v. Derby, 189 N.W.2d 909 (Iowa 1971); Pennington
v. Snow, 471 P.2d 370 (Alaska 1970); Bahler v. Fletcher, 257 Ore. 1, 474 P.2d
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the handful of courts that have already joined California in discard-
ing the need for privity may expect a good deal of company as time
goes on.6 3 This likely development has a number of implications
regarding the exposure of lawyers for negligence in rendering opin-
ion letters, and those implications are discussed in the next section.
IMPLICATIONS OF DIFFERENT OPINION LETTER SETTINGS
In these days of the ubiquitous opinion poll, it is not surprising
that one pollster claims to have made a survey of lawyers' perceptions
of their exposure to liability for the quality of their legal opinions.
329 (1970); Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 25
(1965); Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doc-
trine, 9 STAN. L. Rlv. 281 (1957). There is a clear analogy that may be drawn
between the California court's rejection of the mutuality doctrine in collateral es-
toppel cases and its refusal to adhere to the strict need for privity espoused by
Ward. The mutuality rule has been attacked "as destitute of any semblance of
reason, and as 'a maxim which one would suppose to have found its way from
the gaming-table to the bench' . . . ." Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944,
954 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964), quoting 3 J. BENThAM, RATION-
ALE OF JusucAL EvmENcE 579 (1827). There appears to be little to choose from
between the lack of logic criticized by Bentham and the hollow argument ad-
vanced by the Supreme Court in Ward that the "only safe rule" is to bar recovery
by those not in privity, because "if we go one step beyond that, there is no rea-
son why we should not go fifty." 100 U.S. at 203.
63. In addition to Rusch Factors and Ryan v. Kanne, several cases evidence
a willingness to abandon Ward where the alleged wrongdoer actually knew of the
third party's intended reliance or appreciated that the intent of the transaction
was to benefit the third party. See Robinson v. Colebrook Guar. Say. Bank, 109
N.H. 382, 254 A.2d 837 (1969) (holding that third party stated a good cause of
action on allegation of negligence against bank where phrase "payable on death to
X" used for savings account was legally insufficient); Howarth v. Pfeiffer, 443
P.2d 39 (Alaska 1968) (plaintiff was allowed to recover from defendant insurer who
told plaintiff that property was insured by X, causing plaintiff to cancel his in-
surance); Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. James, 466 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. App. 1971)
(accountants held liable for preparation of financial statements they knew would
be relied upon by plaintiff in extending loan to their client). But see Stephens
Indus., Inc. v. Haskins & Sells, 438 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1971) (refusing to find that
Colorado courts would allow recovery from negligent accountants by third party).
The movement toward the abandonment of privity recently received a signifi-
cant nudge in the form of an American Law Reports annotation arguing that "the
strict privity doctrine, with its potential for unrecompensable injury to innocent
parties . . . [does not present] a workable solution to the question of an attor-
ney's liability to third parties." Annot., supra note 36, at 1185 (1972). The
Annotation advocates an eclectic approach similar to that advanced by the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court in Biakanja. It is also worthy of note that England's high-
est court appears to have adopted the view that professionals may be held liable
for negligence without regard to privity. See Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller &
Partners, Ltd., [1964] A.C. 465 (1963). The Hedley Byrne case essentially
adopts the "knew or should have known" approach advocated in the Ward dissent.
See Accountants' Liability to Third Parties-The Hedley Byrne Decision, 120 J.
AcCOUNTANCY, Oct., 1965, at 66-67.
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The survey, undefined as to scope and bearing no claim of statistical
accuracy, is said to have yielded the conclusion that lawyers do not
expect to be held answerable for their written opinions. 4 While the
cases discussed in the preceding section seem to indicate that a
change in such an outlook may be merited, it is recognized that
cases such as Rusch Factors and Ryan v. Kanne deal only with ac-
countants, and thus there is room for the argument that their teach-
ings have no applications to lawyers in light of the different roles
played by the two professions in our society. Proponents of the
view that the two professions are worlds apart in terms of public ac-
countability may draw support from dicta in the SEC's decision in
American Finance Co.65 In that ruling the SEC determined that an
accountant who also served as a lawyer for a registrant was not "in-
dependent" under the SEC's Accounting Rules. 66 The pertinent
language in the Commission's decision reads as follows:
Though owing a public responsibility, an attorney in acting as
the client's advisor, defender, advocate and confidant enters into a
personal relationship in which his principal concern is with the inter-
ests and rights of his client. The requirement of the Act of certifica-
tion by an independent accountant, on the other hand, is intended to
secure for the benefit of public investors the detached objectivity of a
disinterested person.67
64. Corso, Opinions of Counsel: Responsibilities and Liabilities, 17 CLEV.-MAR.
L. Rrv. 375 (1968).
65. 40 S.E.C. 1043 (1962).
66. The Commission's rule as to the independence of accountants is set forth
in 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(b) (1972). See also SEC Accounting Series Release No. 126
(July 5, 1972) (setting forth guidelines and examples of situations involving in-
dependence of accountants).
67. American Fin. Co., 40 S.E.C. 1043, 1049 (1962). To the same effect are
the following remarks made by Milton V. Freeman at the American Bar Associa-
tion's National Institute on the BarChris case:
Now, you ask why is it, if there is a development of the law in the
direction of liability on accountants, that there should not be liability
upon lawyers equally?
The answer is, I think, in the nature of the representation that is
made by each.
I have here the language of the American Institute of Accountants
which says: "I am objective and impartial. I am as mindful of the in-
terests of strangers who may rely on my opinion as on my clients' interests."
I know no lawyer would ever say that. A lawyer says, "I am a
partisan. I have been retained by my clients. I owe him my full loyalty
and responsibility. I want everybody to know that those are the rules of
my profession."
The accountant makes an entirely different kind of representation
and there are indeed signs that the law is moving in the direction of
holding accountants liable to somebody other than his client.
The law, so far, is very clear. The lawyers' responsibility is ex-
clusively to their own client. Proceedings, ABA Nat'l Institute, The
BarChris Case: Prospectus Liability, 24 Bus. LAw. 523, 639 (1969).
See also Karmel, supra note 4, at 1162-64.
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The principal shortcoming of any abstract argument designed
to distinguish the public responsibilities of lawyers from those of ac-
countants is, of course, that stereotypes are useless in deciding con-
crete cases-accountants do not always function as relentless blood-
hounds and lawyers do not in every circumstance serve as kindly
father-confessors. An argument built around emphasis on a law-
yer's "traditional role" fails to account for cases where there is vir-
tually no distinction between the action taken by a lawyer and the
service rendered by an accountant. And it is in the rendition of
formal opinions that the services performed by the two professions
shade together and become indistinguishable. In this area, to hold
accountants responsible for their opinions and, at the same time, to
permit lawyers to escape liability would indeed vest the legal calling
with a "privileged protection against responsibility."'6 8
Municipal Bond Opinions
While the essential similarity of the lawyer's opinion and the
accountant's audit certificate has not escaped the notice of the courts
or the commentators, 69 this likeness does not mean that the two
types of professional opinions must perforce be taken to be identical
in nature and consequence. The inappropriateness of trying to com-
pare a certain type of legal opinion to the auditor's certificate with-
out regard to the setting in which the legal opinion is rendered is
strikingly illustrated by a false step taken by Judge Cardozo in his
Ultramares opinion. In the course of his discussion of the policy
reasons for limiting the exposure of accountants to the parameters
of privity, Judge Cardozo said that the expansion of liability for
negligence to accountants would likewise encompass the conduct of
"many callings other than an auditor's," including "[llawyers who
certify their opinion as to the validity of municipal or corporate
bonds with knowledge that the opinion will be brought to the
notice of the public. '70  Given the validity of the court's doubt in
Ultramares that the "average businessman" who had invested in a
company would expect to recover from a company's accountants for
their negligence in auditing the company's books,71 the accountant/
68. See text accompanying note 61 supra.
69. See SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v.
Danser, 26 F.R.D. 580, 587 (D. Mass. 1959), aff'd, 281 F.2d 492 (1st Cir. 1960);
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 188, 174 N.E. 441, 448 (1931); Note,
Public Accountants and Attorneys: Negligence and the Third Party, 47 No'm DAME
LAV. 588, 607 (1972).
70. 255 N.Y. at 188, 174 N.E. at 448 (1931).
71. Id. at 189, 174 N.E. at 448.
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bond counsel analogy is infirm since an investor purchasing a bond
for which a legal opinion had been issued has a very legitimate basis
for the opposite expectation. As one practitioner has pointed out,
[t]hose of you who have ever fooled around in the field of municipal
bonds would not be so surprised at the notion of a lawyer's opinion
running to the public. I will never forget my utter horror when I
found that an opinion given on a security by bond counsel not only is
relied upon by the public and the purchasers, but is stapled to the se-
curity and later printed on the back of the security, as indeed it still is
today. . . . The bond counsel firm is chosen because its reputation
in the field is such that purchasers will buy the security relying on the
opinion of the firm and that opinion, thereafter, accompanies the se-
curity through its life3 2
Just as Judge Cardozo's municipal bond opinion/auditor's cer-
tificate analogy is questionable from the standpoint of third parties'
reasonable expectations, so also is there reason to question whether
the same policy considerations that attend the issuance of audit cer-
tificates likewise apply in the case of municipal bond opinions. In
the audit certificate situation, the Ultramares court apparently deter-
mined that the public's interest in the effective functioning of busi-
ness affairs was best served by allowing accountants to act as inde-
pendent historians and report on business performance free from
the threat of broad liability for honest errors. One may wonder
whether a similar interest is served by allowing a law firm to make
the representations and foster the reliance that exists in the bond
area free from the threat of liability to those persons who justifiably
rely on the firm's opinion. Such an exemption from liability is par-
ticularly questionable where the firm allows its good name to be
used to enhance the value of the security to which the opinion is
attached.
Because of the arguably different expectations on the part of
investors and in light of seemingly different policy considerations that
arise with respect to bond opinions and audit certificates, it is cer-
tainly possible that a court committed to Ultramares on the issue of
auditors' liability might, choose not to shield similarly bond counsel
from liability for a negligently rendered opinion. This same type of
reasoning may come into play in the context of opinions issued in
connection with public offerings.
72. Panel Discussion, supra note 20, at 961 (remarks of Frederic L. Ballard).
Accord, TRANscgnnr, supra note 14, at 169 (remarks of A.A. Sommer); cf. id.





A similar situation involving the use of counsel's name in an
attempt to enhance the value of a security arises in the public offer-
ig area. Of the two sorts of opinions rendered in connection with a
public offering, the first type sets forth a lawyer's judgment on spe-
cific legal matters that are of importance to the offering. These
matters may include due incorporation of the issuer, proper issuance
of the securities, and tax consequences. Opinions of this sort are
disclosed in the registration statement and counsel recognize that
they are prepared and disclosed "for the benefit . . .of all pur-
chasers of the stock. a73  In addition to the possibility of common
law liability for an error in the rendition of this first type of opinion,
there is the threat that counsel may be held liable as an expert under
section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act) 74 to purchasers
of the issue.
In brief, section 11 gives a right of civil recovery to persons
who purchase securities issued in conjunction with a materially mis-
leading registration statement75 filed pursuant to section 5 of the
1933 Act.76 Lack of privity is no barrier to suit,77 and proof of re-
liance on the misrepresentation is not strictly required.78 . Thus, the
effect of section 1 l's intricate civil recovery scheme is to undercut
Ultramares with respect to accountants and other persons "whose
profession gives authority" to their work and who consent to being
73. Officers' and Directors' Institute, supra note 18, at 135 (remarks of Rob-
ert A. McDowell).
74. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970).
75. For standing to sue to exist, the shares held by the plaintiff must have
been issued pursuant to the registration statement in question and not some other
registration statement. Colonial Realty Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 257 F. Supp.
875 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (defendant's motion for summary judgment granted because
plaintiff had not purchased shares issued pursuant to the allegedly misleading reg-
istration statement).
76. Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1970).
77. See Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 YALE L.. 227, 249
(1933) (calling, the dispensation with the need for privity "the most striking inno-
vation" of the section).
78. If the plaintiff acquires the security after the issuer has made generally
available to its securities holders an earnings statement covering at least a twelve
month period subsequent to the registration statement's effective date, then the
right to recovery is conditioned on the plaintiffs proof that the security was
acquired in reliance on the alleged misrepresentation. However, proof of the
requisite reliance may be made without a showing that plaintiff read the registra-
tion statement. Securities Act of 1933 § 11(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1970). In
the absence of this special situation a claimant must only avoid the defense that he
knew of the claimed defect in the registration statement at the time he bought the
security. Id.
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named as "experts" in the registration statements, 79 and to impose
broad liability for negligent misrepresentations made by such pro-
fessionals. Liability may be avoided only by a showing of exercise
of due diligence under the circumstances.80
In the leading case of Escoti v. BarChris Construction Corp.,81
the federal district court held that, while the defendant accounting
firm was liable under section 11 for negligence in the conduct of its
review of the issuer's financial position, the defendant attorney who
served as a director of the issuer and who prepared the registration
statement was not liable as an expert for material misstatements aris-
ing from his negligence in putting the registration statement to-
gether, since the section does not contemplate expert liability for
lawyers who supervise registration statement filings.82 The defen-
dant attorney was, however, held liable to plaintiffs under section 11
in his capacity as director. Though the BarChris holding provides
protection from liability for counsel who generally supervise prepara-
tion of the registration statement, the case clearly does not protect
attorneys in the instances already referred to where counsel is named
79. Seeid.§ 77k(a)(4).
80. See Securities Act of 1933 § 11(b)(3)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(B)
(1970).
81. 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). For the definitive treatment of the
case, see Folk, Civil Liabilities Under the Federal Securities Acts: The BarChris
Case, 55 VA. L. Rav. 1, 199 (1969). Commentaries on the case are collected and
discussed in Keefe, Boils and Bubble, Bowling BarChris, 56 A.B.A.J. 92 (1970).
82. The sound basis for the court's failure to subject the lawyer to an ex-
pert's liability was explained by Professor Donald Schwartz:
One of the outside directors, I think this is most interesting for us,
was the attorney who actually prepared the registration statement. The
first thing the other defendants said was, "Your honor, I intend to come
clean and tell the truth; he did it." Their defense was that he had overall
responsibility for preparing the registration statement and, therefore,
was an expert within the meaning of the 1933 Act. The significance of
that is that section 11 "contains a provision to the effect that if a portion of
a prospectus has been prepared by an expert, the non-experts can rely on
him unless they have good reason for thinking he has not done the job
properly, or that there is some inaccuracy." They said, "We relied on
this expert. Therefore he is liable for everything and we are liable for
nothing."
Judge McLean rejected this contention; he found the lawyer is not
an expert, at least with regard to the entire registration statement.
There may be matters where the lawyer is an expert. For example, if
there is a tax opinion expressed. I think others can safely rely on that
without fear of liability on their own part. The expert takes responsibility
for that particular type of assertion.
The concept of expertise cannot apply to the whole registration
statement, or everybody would let someone else bear the brunt for him,
which would flout the scheme that Congress had in mind. How TO Go
PUBLIC, supra note 14, at 304-06.
For further views on the scope of an attorney's liability as an expert under
section 11, see BarChris Institute, supra note 67, at 555-56, 591, 676 (remarks
of Arnold Daum, Jack M. Whitney H, and Milton V. Freeman, respectively).
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in the registration statement in connection with opinions rendered
on such technical matters as tax consequences br the validity of the
securities issued. 3 This type of "expert" opinion can give rise to
section 11 liability.
In contrast with expert opinions is the opinion rendered by
counsel in connection with a public offering which states that the
registration statement has been reviewed in an agreed-upon man-
ner84 and that counsel has no reason to believe that the registration
statement is misleading in any material respect. Although Bar-
Chris indicates that there is no section 11 liability for such opinions,
there is still the question of counsel's exposure for common law mal-
practice as a result of his lack of diligence in the rendition of this
type of opinion where counsel is listed in the prospectus as having
"passed on" the registration statement for the company. While it
has been argued that no liability should attach even where counsel
is listed in the prospectus because investors do not rely on counsels
identity in making their investment decisions, 85 it has also been
pointed out that, as in the municipal bond case, counsel are listed
in the prospectus "on the theory that their names and standing have
some impact on the judgment of investors as to whether or not to
purchase the security. 80 Given this clear attempt to engender reli-
ance on counsel by investors, it would seem that the existence or
nonexistence of reliance by a third party is a factual matter best left
for resolution upon consideration of individual parties' claims, and
not a matter which should be resolved by a blanket finding of non-
reliance or absence of duty.
Title Opinions
In addition to the municipal bond and public offering cases,
there are other common legal opinion settings that could give rise to
liability to third parties for negligent malpractice should a court elect
83. See BarChris Institute, supra note 67, at 555-56, 591, 676 (remarks of
Arnold Daum, Jack M. Whitney II, and Milton V. Freeman, respectively).
84. For a statement on the need to reach clear agreement on the scope of
counsel's responsibilities at the outset, see id. at 654 (remarks of David S. Henkel).
85. Address by Francis M. Wheat, the Fourth Annual Institute on Securities
Regulation, New York City, Nov. 3, 1972.
86. WBEN CORPORATIONS Go PuBLIC 251 (C. Israels & G. Duff ed. 1970).
See also TRANScRIPT, supra note 14, at 139, 144. It should be noted that the argu-
ment has been made that remedial claims by an injured shareholder may include
allegations under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, as well as section 11 and com-
mon law charges. See id. at 148-59. Opinion letter claims under securities laws
civil liability provisions other than section 11 are discussed in the context of opin-
ions freeing unregistered stock for sale at pp. 395-411 infra.
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to step beyond the privity barricade. A prime example is the opin-
ion on the state of title similar to the one issued in the Ward case.8"
Given the common expectation of lawyers that opinions concerning
the state of title property will be relied upon by third parties, 88 a
future court may well decide to adopt the view advocated by
the dissent in Ward and allow recovery for negligent malprac-
tice by a reliant lender or purchaser whose precise identity was
unforeseen at the time the opinion was rendered. Because of the
custom and usage surrounding the rendition of a title opinion, a court
could well justify a holding of liability even where the lawyer was
not told the exact purpose to which the opinion would be put; it
would suffice for the plaintiff to belong to a class known to rely
customarily on such opinions.
Audit Letters
In connection with the audit of a public company, accountants
often seek lawyers' opinions directed toward issues requiring special
legal expertise such as the company's freedom from material contin-
gent liabilities (as, for example, where title to a significant amount
of real estate held by a company is in doubt)8 9 and the materiality
of pending litigation. What is the scope of the attorney's liability
to third parties where the erroneous conclusion of a negligently ren-
dered opinion to the accountant is eventually reflected in the com-
pany's certified financial statements? A court willing to make the
same sort of public policy judgment arrived at in Ultramares logi-
cally would decide not to hold the lawyer liable for simple negligence
in assessing the status of the company's contingent liabilities where
it would not by parity in reasoning hold the accountant liable for
negligence in assessing the status of the company's current or long-
term liabilities. By the same token, if a court were to reject Ultra-
mares and impose liability on the accountant for negligence, it
should have little difficulty holding the negligent attorney similarly
liable.90
87. See notes 33-36 supra and accompanying text.
88. Annot., supra note 36, at 1200.
89. A recent and increasing tendency for law firms to adopt a policy of re-
fusing to express opinions on their client's contingent liabilities has been ob-
served. The reason, of course, is the fear of turning a contingent liability into an
existing one by calling a problem to the attention of plaintiffs' lavyers. Address
by Francis M. Wheat, supra note 85.
90. Apart from negligence liability, an attorney's judgment set forth in an
audit letter that is later reflected in the company's certified financial statements
used in a prospectus will afford a basis for liability on the part of the lawyer un-
der section 11, provided he consents to having his name connected with the rep-
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Opinions on the Sale of Unregistered Stock
The final type of legal opinion that is taken up in this analysis
of different opinion letter settings concerns the use of opinions to
facilitate the sale of unregistered stock. Primary emphasis in the
following discussion is on sketching a number of the considerations
that may come into play in assessing counsel's potential exposure for
a faulty stock sale opinion.
The statutory context. Section 5 of the 1933 Act9 1 broadly pro-
hibits the use of the mail or facilities of interstate commerce to sell a
security unless a registration statement filed with the SEC is in ef-
fect, and any person claiming the benefit of an exemption to the fil-
ing requirement has the burden of proving his right to it.92 Be-
cause of the highly technical nature of the Act, persons faced with
the threat of potential liability in connection with the sale of unregis-
tered stock have generally adopted the practice of requiring those in-
volved in such stock transfers to present opinions of counsel stating
that the shares may be sold without registration.
Thus, where a shareholder desires to sell unregistered stock,
the issuing corporation may demand an opinion by or acceptable to
its counsel to the effect that the exemption relied on in issuing the
shares without registration will not be lost by reason of the sale.9 3
In another case, a person who wishes to dispose of shares taken in a
private placement may require his transferee to present an opinion
of counsel to the effect that the transferee is not intent on engaging
in an illegal distribution of the stock, since this could result in both
resentation in the registration statement. See notes 74-83 supra and accompany-
ing text. Cohen & Wheat, Professional Responsibility, reprinted in PLI, FoURTH
ANNuAL INsTrrTu- ON Sncunrrms REGULATION 75, 81 (1972). For a more de-
tailed discussion of audit letters, see Deer, Lawyers' Responses to Auditors' Re-
quests for Information, 28 Bus. LAw. 947 (1973).
91. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970).
92. See, e.g., SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953); Edwards v.
United States, 312 U.S. 473 (1941); SEC v. Culpepper, 270 F.2d 241 (2d Cir.
1959); Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1959).
93. An opinion of this sort is involved in the National Student Marketing
litigation. As discussed at pp. 421, 426-29 infra, the law firm of Lord, Bissell & Brook
issued an opinion letter to National Student Marketing Corp., stating that certain
insiders of Interstate National Corp. could sell without a registration statement
shares of NSMC which they acquired by merger. The exemption relied on was
that set forth in rule 133, 17 C.F.R. § 230.133 (1972), which provides generally
that the registration provisions of section 5 are not applicable to securities issued in
certain business combinations of a type specified in the rule. Further, the rule
permits certain limited resales of those securities. Other than registration, rule
133 provides no exceptions or exemptions from any other provisions of the federal
securities laws, including the antifraud provisions.
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sellers being held in violation of the Act as "statutory underwrit-
ers."94  Broker-dealers similarly use legal opinions for protection
from charges that they acted in the capacity of statutory underwriters
in connection with the distribution to the public of substantial blocks
of unregistered stock.95
Securities laws exposure. From the earlier discussion of a law-
yer's common law malpractice exposure for his legal opinions, it
should be clear that counsel runs a substantial risk of malpractice
liability to persons for whose reliance a negligently prepared unreg-
istered stock sale opinion is intended. In this section, the general
parameters of a lawyer's potential securities laws liability for unreg-
istered stock sale opinions will be considered. Following an intro-
ductory analysis of the possible types of actions an opining lawyer
may be called on to defend under the securities laws, consideration
is given to three key areas of concern in assessing the lawyer's ex-
posure qua lawyer under the securities laws for an erroneous opinion.
The first two areas concern the extent of a lawyer's obligation to see
that his opinion is right on both the facts stated and the law applied.
The third area for consideration is the principle that the lawyer's
exposure for his actions in a legal capacity is dependent upon his
acting as a "participant" in an illegal transaction.
(1) Gradations in liability. Three types of actions may be
filed against a lawyer charged with violating the securities laws.
First, under rule 2(e) of its Rules of Practice,96 the SEC is em-
powered to institute disciplinary proceedings against professionals
who, among other things, are believed by the Commission "to have
engaged in improper or unethical professional conduct. '97  Among
94. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1970). The section defines an underwriter as,
inter alia, "any person who . . .offers or sells for an issuer in connection with
the distribution of any security, or participates or has . . . a participation in any
such undertaking .... ." The SEC is of the view that the concept of "dis-
tribution" is vital to interpreting the meaning of "underwriter." SEC Securities
Act Release No. 5223 (Jan. 11, 1972) (adoption of rule 144). In brief, the
Commission feels that the salient factors to be considered in evaluating whether a
person has engaged in a distribution are: (1) whether there is "adequate current
information concerning the issuer"; (2) the existence of a "holding period prior to
resale"; and (3) the "impact of the particular transaction or transactions on the
trading markets." Id. Where section 4(1) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1)
(1970), is used as a basis for exemption from registration, it is imperative that the
seller not be an "underwriter," for the section only exempts from registration
"transactions by any person other than an issuer, underwriter or dealer."
95. The use of legal opinions by broker-dealers in the context of section 4(1)
exemptions is discussed in SEC Securities Exch. Act Release No. 6721 (Feb. 2, 1962).
96. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1970).
97. Id. § 201.2(e)(1). See generally Comment, supra note 5.
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the sanctions that may be imposed upon an attorney found liable is
suspension of the right to practice before the Commission. The
second type of proceeding which may be brought against the attorney
is an action by the SEC for a civil injunction restraining the defend-
ant attorney from further violations. The National Student Mar-
keting litigation mentioned in the introduction is such a case. This
type of action may serve as a basis for a later rule 2(e) proceeding
and may result in a contempt of court finding in the event of a sub-
sequent securities laws violation by the enjoined lawyer.98 The third
type of action that may arise from a lawyer's violation of the securi-
ties laws is the familiar civil action instituted by private litigants.
This type of remedy could come into play where counsel's opinion
furthers an illegal scheme involving the sale of unregistered stock.
In such a case counsel might be called on to defend suits brought un-
der section 17(a) of the 1933 Act99 and section 10(b) of the
1934 Act'00 and rule lOb-5 thereunder.' 0 ' Civil actions may be
brought under those sections for redress of fraud perpetrated in the
sale of securities.'02 Section 12(1) of the 1933 Act 0 3 provides for
civil recovery from sellers who violate section 5 and has come into
play in unregistered stock sale suits against lawyers, 04 but the section
does not appear to hold much promise for plaintiffs seeking to re-
cover from lawyers in opinion letter cases absent facts showing that
the defendant attorney was either a seller or solicited the illegal
sale.'0 5
While the same sort of malfeasance may well expose an attor-
ney to an adverse judgment in either the rule 2(e) disciplinary pro-
98. See note 4 and text accompanying notes 3-4 supra.
99. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970).
100. Id. § 78j(b).
101. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1972).
102. The two 1934 Act provisions are broader in scope, covering fraud per-
petrated in connection with stock purchases as well as sales.
103. 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1970).
104. In Wonneman v. Stratford Sec. Co., [1957-1961 Transfer Binder] CCH
FFn. SEC. L. REP. 91,034 at 93,458 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), defendant attorney was
charged with assisting in the illegal sale of unregistered securities in violation of
section 12(1). At trial it was shown that the lawyer's only contact with the
transaction in question involved his giving an oral opinion to one of the sellers to
the effect that the stock could be sold absent registration. The court held that
these facts were sufficient for venue purposes, but inadequate to make out a winning
case that the defendant attorney was a "seller" within the intent of the section.
Cf. Nicewarner v. Bleavins, 244 F. Supp. 261 (D. Colo. 1965) (holding that an
attorney who had drafted assignments later found to be securities illegally sold
without registration was not a seller within the terms of the section since he had
not actually sold or solicited the sale of the securities).
105. See Nicewarner v. Bleavins, 244 F. Supp. 261, 266 (D. Colo. 1965).
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ceeding, injunction action, or private damage action, this is not to
say that there are no tangible gradations in the standards of conduct
which the different remedial frameworks encompass. To the con-
trary, the degree of culpability giving rise to a rule 2(e) action by the
Commission is arguably less than might be required to support an
injunction action. 106 Further, the level of culpability sufficient to
sustain entry of an injunction in favor of the SEC will not necessarily
support a judgment in a damage action brought by a private in-
vestor.' 07 Within these categories, however, there is obviously still
much room for the exercise of discretion.
Apart from the general statement that the burden of establishing
liability is more easily sustained in a rule 2(e) proceeding than in civil
litigation, it is hard to find articulated in the cases useful standards for
gauging the exposure of professionals for alleged wrongs in the
securities law field. One reason for this void is, as pointed out in the
next section, the paucity of decisions that consider the exposure of a
lawyer in his capacity as a lawyer without intermingling judgments
on the defendant lawyer's participation in the wrongdoing in some
other capacity. Another reason why the precedents may be somewhat
difficult to unscramble is related to the labels used by the courts in
deciding the standard of conduct required to establish antifraud
liability in an action for damages under section 10(b) and rule IOb-5.
For example, the Second and Fifth Circuits apparently require some
form of "scienter" to uphold a judgment of liability in a 10b-5 damage
action, although the requisite intent can probably be deduced from
gross negligence or recklessness.10 8  The Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and
perhaps Tenth Circuits have given some indication that scienter is
not a requirement under 10b-5, thus paving the way for a finding of
liability in the event of negligence.' 0 9
106. See TRANscmPT, supra note 14, at 123-24 (remarks of Professor Robert
H. Mundheim).
107. See, e.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 193
(1963); Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 596-97 (2d Cir. 1969); SEC v. Great Am.
Indus., Inc., 407 F.2d 453, 460 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 290 (1970).
108. Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970); SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 867-68 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976
(1969).
109. Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
852 (1970); Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965); Kohler v. Kohler
Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir.
1961). The Tenth Circuit's decision in Stevens should be compared with the
more recent and less liberal holding by the court in Mitchell v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971). See
generally Bucklo, Scienter and Rule 10b-.5, 67 Nw. U.L. RE'v. 562 (1972).
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While there are colorable reasons that may be cited in opposi-
tion to any securities law antifraud damage verdicts against lawyers
whose malpractice meets only a negligence standard,11° in actual
practice it will likely matter little whether a court demands proof of
110. For one thing, it may be argued that the states have a clear and strong
interest in governing the conduct of attorneys within their borders from the time
character references are first filled out in connection with completion of bar
examination applications through retirement, and that this important state interest
should not yield to federal intervention without good reason. Such federal inter-
vention would come into play where, for example, a federal court finds counsel
liable under the securities laws for "negligence" by reason of his failure to under-
take an investigation of facts presented by his client, with the duty to investigate
forming no part of the relevant state's malpractice law. Significant support for
this view that federal intervention may be improper in such circumstances is
found in the area of corporate fiduciary responsibilities where there is a compara-
ble state interest. In judging breach of fiduciary duty claims alleged to arise un-
der the securities laws, the federal judiciary has been known to refrain from usurp-
ing the province of the states to develop their own code of conduct for fiduciaries.
For the reasoning underlying this exercise of federal restraint, see Kaminsky v.
Abrams, 281 F. Supp. 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), where the court stated:
The fiduciary responsibilities of corporate directors are . . defined
by the law of the state of incorporation. Federal legislation supersedes
state corporate law remedies only to the extent of any direct conflict be-
tween the two . . . and unless a matter is clearly covered exclusively by
federal statute it is deemed to be subject to state law. If Congress
had intended to preempt the entire field, "so revolutionary a federal
intervention," Loss says, "would presumably have been clearly expressed,"
II Loss, Securities Regulation 903. Thus, although federal securities
laws have been construed broadly in the light of their remedial purposes
. .. they remain "incomplete and interstitial" in nature . .. and do not
represent a federal corporate law with respect to responsibility of offi-
cers and directors that has supremacy over state law, which Congress has
never adopted. Id. at 504-05.
Accord, Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 809 (5th Cir. 1970). See Christo-
phides v. Porco, 289 F. Supp. 403, 405-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Barnett v. Anaconda
Co., 238 F. Supp. 766, 770 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). By the same token, it might be
argued that Congress has never adopted a plan that would permit federal courts
to usurp the state function of overseeing standards governing simple negligence
(as opposed to fraud) by professionals. It would seem that the SEC has power
already under rule 2(e) of its Rules of Practice to discipline professionals who en-
gage in unethical or improper professional conduct or, wilfull fraud. See Com-
ment, supra note 5. There is no apparent reason for the federal judiciary to insert
itself into the negligent malpractice matrix under the guise of making determina-
tions under "antifraud" provisions. But cf. TRANSCRuT, supra note 14, at 40,
where it is noted that "no matter what's in the Code, in the state statutes or in
the state cases, federal courts will end up applying federal rules in [the attorney-
client relationship] area."
Another reason why courts should be reluctant to award recovery under the
antifraud provisions for negligent malpractice is related to the major policy deter-
mination made in Ultramares of limiting suits brought by a member of a broad
class of allegedly injured persons. If this policy had vitality in 1931 when Ultra-
mares was decided, it should have far greater force in this day of the ubiquitous
class action law suit in securities law cases.
Class actions seeking recovery at common law for negligent malpractice do
not pose a grave threat to professionals for a number of reasons. First, very few
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negligence, gross negligence or scienter. A court or jury convinced
that a defendant attorney ought to be held liable for an incorrect
states have embraced the class action as a legitimate device for awarding mass
recovery in cases where each class member has a separate claim for relief. Cf.
Eckhardt, Consumer Class Actions, 45 NomE DAME LAw. 663 (1970); Homburger,
State Class Actions and the Federal Rule, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 609 (1971); Wall
Street J., May 14, 1970, at 10, cols. 1-2. Second, class action relief in federal
diversity cases is limited by the requirement of Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332
(1969), that each class member have a claim for relief in excess of $10,000.
A recent case discussing this problem is Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469
F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972). Third, even where a state court might be willing to
entertain the suit, it may very well be unwilling to award relief to nonresident class
members. See Anthony v. General Motors Corp., No. 959,058 (Los Angeles
Calif. Super. Ct., Dec. 22, 1971); Robiner v. General Motors Corp., No. 172,865
(Wayne Cty. Mich. Cir. Ct., July 22, 1971) (both cases involve refusals by courts
to allow nationwide class actions in products liability cases). Finally, there is a
serious question whether the character of a malpractice suit based on alleged negli-
gence lends itself to class action treatment. Because the nature of the wrong
claimed is negligence, each alleged class member would be required to establish
injury proximately caused by the asserted malpractice just as would be the case if
a class member sued individually. See, e.g., Note, Attorney Malpractice, supra
note 23, at 1307. This need for individual proof by each class member could very
well disqualify the suit from class action consideration by making the trial pro-
tracted and unmanageable. See Schaffner v. Chemical Bank, [1971-1972 Transfer
Binder], CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 93,403 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Cannon v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 53 F.R.D. 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). On the other hand, a ruling
by the court that the burden of individual proof could be lessened or dispensed with
altogether because of the class action character of the litigation would amount
to modification of the requirements for a substantive cause of action by use of a
procedural rule. This development is offensive to our common law tradition and
could very well deprive a defendant of his fourteenth amendment right to assert
individual defenses which he might establish if he could confront each class member
individually. See American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156, 168 (1932)
("Due process requires that there be an opportunity to present every available
defense.").
In sum, there is a good basis for belief that in malpractice suits alleging
common law negligence, the ascendancy of the class action device does not pose a
serious threat to the policy recognized in Ultramares. This would manifestly
not be the case should the antifraud provisions of the securities laws provide a
haven for malpractice actions based on negligent misconduct. Resort to the class
action device is well-recognized as a means of securing redress for alleged viola-
tions of the securities laws. See Annot., Propriety, Under Rules 23(a) and 23(b)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as Amended in 1966, of Class Action
for Violation of Federal Securities Laws, 9 A.L.R. Fed. 118 (1971); cf. "ADAM
SMITH," SUPERMONEY 166-69 (1972). This development makes likely the threat of
massive exposure of professionals for simple negligence if courts accept a diluted
definition of fraud in malpractice cases brought under the securities laws. It may
be argued that under these circumstances, allowance of class actions under the secu-
rities laws would clearly contravene the policy inherent in Ultramares of limiting the
vistas of professional liability where there is no inference of fraud. Whether the




opinion can easily categorize his performance as negligent if that will
suffice, or grossly negligent if that standard of misconduct is neces-
sary to support a violation of the securities laws in the particular
jurisdiction.
(2) The lawyer's responsibility to be right on the facts. In
1962 the SEC set forth the standard of care it felt was required of an
attorney called on to issue an unregistered stock sale opinion:
Obviously, an attorney's opinion... is worthless... if unspecified
but vital facts are not considered. Because of this, it is the practice
of responsible counsel not to furnish an opinion . . . unless such
counsel have themselves carefully examined all of the relative circum-
stances and satisfied themselves, to the extent possible, that the con-
templated transaction is in fact, not a part of an unlawful distribution.
Indeed, if an attorney furnishes an opinion based solely upon hypo-
thetical facts which he made no effort to verify, and if he knows that
his opinion will be relied upon as the basis for a substantial distribu-
tion of unregistered securities, a serious question arises as to the pro-
priety of his professional conduct.11
The Commission's pointed comment questioning the propriety
of -the opining lawyer's professional conduct strongly indicates its
willingness to institute proceedings against wayward counsel under
rule 2(e). Assessing whether conduct that the SEC might label
"negligen' or "unprofessional" constitutes a basis for securities laws
liability is, as was noted, a task not made easier by the scarcity of case
law dealing with the issue. While there is no great shortage of
cases and administrative actions finding actionable misconduct on the
part of counsel in connection with fraudulent schemes furthered by
the issuance of legal opinions,"' the attorney is often so closely asso-
111. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4445 (Feb. 2, 1962).
112. United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1964) ("abundant evi-
dence" that defendant attorney issued opinions freeing unregistered stock for sale
when he knew registration was required); SEC v. R.D. Philpot Indus., Inc., 73
Civ. 543 (S.D.N.Y., filed Feb. 5, 1973), noted in N.Y.L.J., Feb. 6, 1973, at 1,
cols. 4-5; United States v. Hamilton, No. 71 Cr. 780 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 27, 1972),
noted in Wall Street J., Sept. 28, 1972, at 3, col. 2; SEC v. Fields, 71 Civ.
5416 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 7, 1972), noted in Wall Street J., Dec. 14, 1971, at 14, col. 2;
SEC v. Century Inv. Transfer Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc.
L REP. 93,232 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Marshall I. Stewart, SEC Securities Act Re-
lease No. 4829 (April 29, 1966) (rule 2(e) proceeding against defendant attor-
ney for, inter alia, issuing groundless opinion letters as to availability of certain
securities laws exemptions); Morris Mac Schwebel, 40 S.E.C. 347 (1960) (rule
2(e) proceeding permanently disqualifying defendant attorney from practicing be-
fore the Commission for, inter alia, issuance of opinions freeing unregistered stock
for sale when he knew or should have known registration was required). A non-
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ciated with the wrongdoing that he is held liable as a primary wrong-
doer in some other capacity than as a lawyer.
A recent and very notable exception to this type of case is SEC
v. Spectrum, Ltd."13  Spectrum involved the application to a con-
crete factual setting in an injunction action of the position taken by
the SEC in its 1962 release that some minimal level of factual in-
quiry is required of counsel who issue opinions freeing unregistered
stock for sale. The defendant attorney in Spectrum was hired by
one or more Spectrum Ltd. insiders of uncertain identity for the pur-
pose of writing an opinion assessing the transferability kf over 2 mil-
lion shares of unregistered stock. The lawyer had had no previous
dealings of any substance with Spectrum or its insiders before under-
taking to write the first formal opinion letter of his ten-year legal
career in order to "free up" the stock. The shares in question had
been the subject of an opinion issued by Spectrum's corporate coun-
sel before the defendant attorney arrived on .the scene. In that opin-
ion Spectrum's counsel had" examined the transferability of some 4.6
million shares and decided that the representations of Spectrum in-
siders warranted 2.6 million shares being restricted. The company's
lawyer would have allowed the remaining 2 million shares to be
"'freed-up' . . . merely because he had no documentation . . . to
the contrary."" 4 Subsequent to rendering this opinion, the corpora-
tion's counsel wrote a letter to Spectrum's president listing the share-
holders who held freely transferable stock.
After he was approached and asked to write an opinion freeing
the 2 million shares for sale, the defendant attorney met with Spec-
trum's corporate counsel. At that meeting the company's regular
lawyer allegedly gave four reasons why he did not want to write an
opinion letter for the defendant's client: (1) as company counsel he
had no duty to do so; (2) he had already prepared an earlier opin-
opinion letter case worthy of note is SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968).
In Frank, the defendant attorney was charged with having drafted a prospectus
that allegedly contained false representations concerning the efficacy of a chemical
additive developed by the issuer. In defense it was argued that the attorney was
only a scrivener and that any liability should be assessed against management
whose representations the attorney merely placed "in proper form," not his own.
388 F.2d at 488. The court rejected this position out of hand:
A lawyer has no privilege to assist in circulating a statement with regard
to securities which he knows to be false simply because his client has fur-
nished it to him. ...
A •lawyer, no more than others, can escape liability for fraud by closing
his eyes to what he saw and could readily understand. Id.
113. [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 93,631, at 92,864
(S.D.N.Y. 1972).
114. Id. at 92,866.
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ion concluding that the stock was transferable; (3) he wanted to
avoid binding himself to the financial community; and (4) he sus-
pected that the stock the defendant had been asked to free would
be traded by a control person in violation of the securities laws. 1I5
This last representation allegedly made to the defendant was found
by the court to be the "only evidence imputing to [defendant's]
knowledge of any possible illegality""" and was eventually evaluated
as hardly credible."17
Employing copies of agreements for the issuance of the shares
under consideration and using the opinion letter and shareholder list
earlier prepared by Spectrum's counsel in what appears to have been
a cut-and-paste fashion, the defendant reached the "opinion" that
the stock was not required to be registered under the securities laws.
Though the narrow scope of the defendant's factual study was not
stated in the opinion, the cover letter transmitting the opinion pointed
out that the defendant had made no factual investigation and was re-
lying only upon the facts as represented to him. Moreover, the trans-
mittal letter stated that the opinion was for the personal use of the
addressee, one Doyen, and was not to be given to any broker or
dealer for the purpose of inducing the sale of unregistered Spectrum
shares.
The defendant's opinion having proved to be groundless, the
SEC sought an injunction to restrain him from violating the securi-
ties laws. The Commission asserted that the defendant had violated
the 1933 Act directly by furthering the sale of unregistered shares as
a statutory underwriter in violation of section 5,118 and also indirectly
by having aided and abetted" 9 a scheme fraudulent under section
17(a), section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 (consisting of the unlawful
sale of unregistered Spectrum shares to pay off personal debts owed
by insiders).
The court refused to find for the SEC on either charge. The
SEC's claim that the defendant was an underwriter was rejected on
the ground that there was "no evidence that any such unregistered
securities were sold on the basis of the letter,"'20 and the court
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 92,867.
118. See note 94 supra.
119. For the definitive treatment of aider and abettor liability, see Ruder,
Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Con-
spiracy, In Pan Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. Ruv.
597 (1972).
120. [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. RP. 93,631, at 92,867.
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found no authority for the view that "mere preparation of an opinion
letter is sufficient to make the preparer an underwriter.' 121  The
Commission's "aider and abettor" claim was likewise rejected. In
brief, for aider and abettor liability to exist under the securities laws,
three things must happen: first, there must be an independent
wrong; second, the alleged aider and abettor must have "knowledge"
of the misconduct (which may be shown by reckless conduct or
by inference);12 2 and third, he must give some quantum of assis-
tance to the wrongdoing.2' Finding neither direct nor circumstan-
tial evidence of knowledge of the improper scheme, the court held
that, while defendant "may have been guilty of some negligence,
there is insufficient evidence to support anything more serious than
that."'1 24  The court's refusal to place the defendant's actions in the
garb of stock fraud is understandable in light of its clear belief that
121. Id.
122. Ruder, supra note 119, at 638. Cf. United States v. Sarantos, 455 F.2d 877,
880-81 (2d Cir. 1973), which is briefly discussed at text accompanying notes
188-90 infra. In the case of SEC v. First Sec. Co., 463 F.2d 981 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972), the Seventh Circuit seemed to cast doubt on the
validity of the knowledge requirement by holding a brokerage firm liable under
the securities laws as an aider and abettor of the fraud perpetrated by its deceased
president. The firm had no knowledge of wrongdoing, and the only assistance it
could be said to have given the wrongdoing was in representing that its president
had provided sound investment counsel and acquiescing in the president's "en-
forcement of a rule regarding the opening of mail which was antithetical to the
prevention of frauds of the type which occurred." 463 F.2d at 988. Apparently
the court felt that the firm's acquiescence in the president's mail opening rule
constituted sufficient recklessness to satisfy the knowledge requirement for aider
and abettor liability. While there is merit to the court's additional findings that
the firm was liable as a principal under agency theory, as a controlling person
under the section 20(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1970), and for
violation of rule 27 of the National Association of Securities Dealers' Rules of Fair
Practice, CCH NASD MANUAL 2177 (1972), it can be argued that the court
missed the mark in its aider and abettor analysis. As one respected commentator
has pointed out, brokerage firms owe direct obligations to the public, including the
duty to supervise their employees, and breach of such duties would seem to give
rise to direct, not secondary, liability. Ruder, supra note 119, at 599-600, 645-46.
On the other hand, it has been suggested that the area of aider and abettor lia-
bility based on participation with "less than actual knowledge" is destined to be
"the focal point for expanding liabilities" under the securities laws. TRANSCRIPT,
supra note 14, at 265-66 (remarks of Martin Lipton). If so, the seemingly tame
brand of recklessness found to be a sufficient basis for liability in First Securities
raises some interesting questions for lawyers. For example, does a law firm that
fails to establish adequate procedures for review of its lawyers' work run the risk of
aiding and abetting a securities law violation committed by one of its lawyers?
Some general guidelines drafted to assist attorneys in avoiding this problem in an
opinion letter setting are set forth at pp. 433-39 infra.
123. Ruder, supra note 119, at 630.
124. [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FaD. SEC. L. REP. % 93,631, at 92,868.
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the SEC had pursued the wrong man. Speaking of Spectrum's cor-
porate counsel who had drafted the opinion originally freeing the
stock "merely because he had no documentation . .. to the con-
trary,""l2' the court stated that he "must consider himself indeed
fortunate not to be named as a defendant herein. ... "I"
We see in Spectrum a good deal ,of compassion for misled coun-
sel. The court's finding of "some negligence" by the defendant is
clear recognition that his conduct did not meet the standard of care
established by the SEC in its 1962 release. Yet the court held the
degree of recklessness required to tip the degree of care exhibited
into the fraud category to be absent. The decisive factor here ap-
parently was the defendant's ability to point to the cover letter ac-
companying his opinion as proof that sale of the securities in reliance
on the opinion was not anticipated. A less lenient judge might have
wondered to what other use the defendant reasonably expected his
opinion to be put.
The defendant in Spectrum obviously had a very close call.
The court's comment regarding the likely liability of Spectrum's
counsel strongly suggests that a lawyer's rendition of an opinion
freeing stock for sale simply because insiders have failed to volun-
teer a reason for restriction can amount to misconduct punishable
under the securities laws. Some inquiry is clearly required by the
SEC's release, but where the limits are to be drawn is a matter that
must depend on the facts of the particular situation.' An opinion
requested by a long-time client having an unblemished record of fair
disclosure of all salient facts will likely require a good deal less in
the way of independent investigation than an opinion rendered on
behalf of a new client or a client known to be in financial difficulties
or known to have been less than candid in his disclosure of factual
matters in the past. Further, it would seem to be a sound policy to
point out specifically in the body of the opinion letter itself the scope
of the investigation conducted and the extent to which representa-
tions of others are relied upon.
Since the defendant's opinion was judged as an original work
product, the court in Spectrum never took up the issue of counsel's
exposure for relying on an erroneous opinion prepared by another
125. Id. at 92,866.
126. Id. at 92,868.
127. A general discussion of the lawyer's duty to investigate facts is set forth in
TRANscRiPT, supra note 14, at 125-31, 176-78. In the course of the discussion,
securities lawyer A. A. Sommer expressed his view that "[tihe language of Rule
10b-5 can certainly be construed to regard a lawyer who renders an opinion with-
out reasonable investigation as engaged in a deceptive act or practice." Id. at 177.
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